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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF UT AH 
EMPIRE CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
EMPIRE CREDIT, INC. , 
Defendant, 
ED T. OLSEN and MARLENE 
SINE, 
Defendants 
Case No. 16237 
and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action on a promissory note executed by defendant Empire 
Credit, Inc. , in favor of Valley Bank and Trust Company, claimed by 
respondent, Empire Corporation, to have been sold and assigned to it. 
Defendants and appellants, Ed T. Olsen and Marlene Sine, were joined as 
defendants in the action on the theory that Empire Credit, Inc., was their 
alter ego and that they were liable because they were trustees of the assets 
of the defendant corporation and had misapplied those assets. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case has not been tried. On October 19, 1976, on the ground that 
defendants had failed to comply with discovery submitted by the plaintiff and 
to obey various orders of the court compelling compliance, the court entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff and against all of the defendants for $84, 788. 78, including interest 
and attorneys' fees. 
Following entry of the judgment, various orders were entered 
conditionally vacating the judgment and staying execution until, on 
September 13, 1978, Honorable G. Hal Taylor entered an order ratifying and 
Subsequently, in an affirming the judgment and directing execution to issue. 
I 
order of January 8, 1979, Judge Taylor entered an order denying a motion to I 
vacate the judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants and appellants, Ed T. Olsen and Marlene Sine. seek reversal 
of the trial court's order denying their motion to vacate the judgment, anc 
remand of the case to the District Court of Salt Lake County with directions 
to vacate the judgment and set the matter for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 21, 1972, approximately two weeks before the action would 
have been barred by the statute of limitations, Empire Corporation filed ; 
complaint against Empire Credit, Inc., EdT. Olsen, and Marlene Sine.in 
which it was averred that Empire Credit, Inc. , had executed a $50, ODO note 
ll t bad in favor of Valley Bank and Trust Company, that only a sma amoun 
- 2 -
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been paid on it, and that prior to the commencement of the action Valley 
Bank and Trust Company had sold and assigned to Empire Corporation all of 
the bank's right, title and interest in the note. 
In a second claim, Empire Corporation averred that defendants Olsen and 
Sine were "officers, directors and sole stockholders" of Empire Credit, and 
that Empire Credit was the alter ego of the individual defendants, making 
them jointly and severally on the note. 
In a third claim, Empire Corporation averred that defendants Olsen and 
Sine having caused or permitted the corporate charter of Empire Credit to be 
suspended and having withdrawn the assets of the corporation for their own 
benefit, they were liable to Empire Corporation, as a creditor, for the amount 
of the note. Judgment was demanded for $45, 500, with interest at 7 percent 
per annum from October 10, 1966, and for a reasonable attorney's fee in the 
sum of $8, 000, and for costs (R. 2-4). 
During the course of the proceedings, motions to dismiss, for leave to 
file a third party complaint, to dismiss the third party complaint, together 
with an answer to the complaint were filed, but the 446 page record, which 
does not include any transcript of testimony, is made up almost entirely of 
interrogatories, answers to interrogatories, and motions for sanctions, and of 
judgments, motions, and memorandums related to them. 
The incidents leading to this appeal began on November 9, 1972, when 
the plaintiff served a set of interrogatories upon the defendants. The 
interrogatories were not answered, and nothing was done to advance the case 
for more than a year. Then, on January 14, 1974, counsel for Empire 
Corporation filed a motion for sanctions, including striking of the motion to 
- 3 -
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dismiss and awarding judgment by default, on the ground that the defendants 
had not answered those interrogatories ( R. 49). Two days later, David E. 
Yocom withdrew as defendants' counsel (R. 52), and on February 4, 
Jay D. Edmunds entered his appearance (R. 54). 
On January 18, 1974, the motion for sanctions was continued without 
date (R. 53) and lay dormant until January 9, 1975, when counsel for Empire 
Corporation filed a notice of hearing on the motions to dismiss and for 
sanctions (R. 55). The motions were set for hearing on January 17, but 
counsel for defendants did not appear. An order was entered denying the 
motion to dismiss and granting the motion for sanctions (R. 56). The 
defendants were 
·documents within 
ordered to answer the interrogatories and produce the I 
20 days of January 27, 1975, and the order provided that in 
the event they did not comply, judgment would be entered on ex ~ 
application of counsel for Empire Corporation (R. 58). 
After various motions and hearings, the court entered an amended order 
on April 29, 1975, giving defendants until April 30, 1975, at 5: 00 o'clock 
p .m. to answer the interrogatories or have judgment entered against them 
(R. 61), and on April 30, 1975, at 4: 03 p. m. , answers to the interrogatories I 
were filed (R. 62). On that same day, a formal order was entered giving the 
defendants until April 30 to file the answers to interrogatories (R. 89). 
On May 29, 
for admissions, 
1975, Empire Corporation served interrogatories, requests I 
and requests for production of documents upon the 
defendants. These discovery documents contained four pages of definitions, 
i 
plus another four pages of definitions attached as Appendix "A". The term ' 
f h t t and in the "identify" occupied two and one-half pages o t e ex , 
interrogatories the defendants were asked to "identify" numerous items and , 
transactions ( R. 90) . 
- 4 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On June 6, 1975, a minute order granted the plaintiff's motion to strike 
the answer and enter judgment, but there is no indication in the file that any 
notice of a hearing on this motion had been sent, and only the plaintiff's 
counsel appeared (R. 116). On June 19, 1975, defendants filed a motion for 
extension of time to comply with discovery, referring to the documents served 
upon them on May 29 (R. 118). 
On July 7, 1975, plaintiff's counsel filed another motion for judgment or 
sanctions, claiming that the defendants had not fully answered 
Interrogatories 5(a)(3) through 5(a)(l3) of the interrogatories that had been 
served in November of 1972 and answered in April of 1975 (R. 140). 
A hearing on this motion was set for July 21. Plaintiff's counsel 
appeared but counsel for defendant did not, and Honorable Bryant H. Croft 
entered a minute order granting the motion for judgment (R. 141). This was 
followed by a formal order dated July 30, 1975 (R. 147) in which the answer 
of the defendants were stricken, their default entered, and judgment entered 
for $45, 500, plus $27, 992. 97 interest, $5 ,000 attorneys' fees, and $28. 50 
costs for a total judgment of $81, 521. 49. 
A motion to set aside this judgment was made on August 11, 1975 
(R. 149), which motion was finally heard on September 9, 1975, at which time 
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow entered a minute order granting the motion to 
set aside the judgment, gave defendants 15 days to answer, and awarded 
plaintiffs an attorney's fee of $50. 
Nothing further appears to have been done until April 20, 1976, when 
plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to strike the minute order (R · 155) · 
Argument on this motion was continued a number of time, but on August 17, 
1976, Judge Snow signed an order vacating the judgment and giving the 
defendants 15 days to answer the interrogatories (R. 166) · 
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On September 22, 1976, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to st 
defendant's answer and to enter a default judgment (R. 167), which 
argued before Judge Snow on October 6, and taken under adviset 
(R. 170). On October 13, 1976, defendants served objections to 
interrogatories and a motion for an extension of time, setting a hearing 
October 22, (R. 171), but on October 19, Judge Snow entered findings 
fact and conclusions of law, and a default judgment against the defend< 
for $84,788.78 (R. 174-179). 
Entry of the judgment was followed by various motions for stays 
execution, to set aside the judgment. to strike affidavits, for imposition 
attorneys' fees. By a minute order of November 22, 1976 (R. 204) all moti1 
were continued to November 24, 1976, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., at which time 
motion to set aside the judgment was taken under advisement by Judge Sr 
(R. 205). 
At about this time Joseph H. Bottum and Clyde C. Patterson filed th 
appearance as co-counsel for defendants (R. 215), and affidavits were fi; 
respecting the illness of the defendants' then counsel, Jay D. Edmunds, a 
the illness of defendant Ed T. Olsen (R. 216). 
No minute order appears to have been entered, but on December 3 
1976, Judge Snow signed and entered an order (prepared by plaintifl 
counsel) requiring payment of $1,000 attorneys' fees to plaintiff and providii 
that the judgment entered on October 19, 1976, would be vacated and 5 
aside 
. . . at such time as defendants have fully answered 
interrogatories and requests for admissions submitted by 
plaintiff, and have produced the documents required to .be 
produced under the terms of plaintiff's request for product~on 
of documents, and have fully complied with the terms of prior 
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orders ~ntered in . this matter requiring the defendants to 
answer mterrogatones and/or requests for admissions and to 
produce documents (R. 272). 
The order also provided in paragraph 2 as follows: 
In the eve.nt that defendants fail to fully comply with the 
conditions imposed under the terms of Paragraph # 1 above 
within 30 days after entry of this order then defendants' 
motion to vacate and set aside the judment e~tered herein on or 
about the 24th day of November, 1976, is hereby denied (R. 273). 
On the following day Judge Snow entered an order "Setting Aside 
Default Judgment and Imposing Terms," which had been prepared by 
Joseph H. Bottum and Clyde C. Patterson (R. 274-275). That order provided 
as follows: 
It is hereby ordered that the default judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff, Empire Corporation, and against the defendant, 
Empire Credit, Inc. , heretofore entered by this court be and 
the same hereby is dismissed and set aside subject to the 
payment by the defendant of the sum of $1,000 in attorneys' 
fees to the plaintiff for the use and benefit of the plaintiff's 
attorney, Ronald Barker. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the said $1, 000 in 
attorneys' fees shall be paid within 30 days of the signing and 
filing of this order by the court and that in the event the said 
$1, 000 is not paid within the said 30 days from the date of 
signing and filing of this order, the defendants' motion to set 
aside default judgment shall be considered to be denied and the 
default judgment heretofore entered in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant shall be reinstated. 
On January 18, 1977, defendants filed an answer to the complaint 
(R. 276), and on January 27, they filed supplemental answers to 
Interrogatories No. 1 and No. 5 of those served on November 9, 1972 
(R. 292-300), and answers to the interrogatories of May 25, 1975 
(R. 301-310), as well as an amended answer to the complaint CR. 311) · 
On March 28, 1977, Judge Snow entered an order striking the order 
entered on December 31, 1976, which had been presented by Joseph Bottum, 
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and affirming the order of December 30, 1976, which had been presented by 
Ronald Barker (R. 336). 
At this point, things began to deteriorate. On June 2, 1977, plaintiff 
filed a "Motion to Strike Stay Order and to Confirm Judgment" (R. 340-342) 
taking the position that defendants had violated the court's prio~ order by 
objecting to some of the interrogatories rather than answering them. This 
motion was heard by Honorable Dean E. Conder on June 22, 1977, at which 
time he entered a minute order denying the motion in part and requiring the 1 
defendants to furnish income tax returns from 1972 forward (R. 355). This 
minute order ultimately became the basis for three separate orders presented 
to Judge Conder by the plaintiff's counsel on three separate occasions, all of 
them signed by Judge Conder. 
On July 18, 
(R. 356-357): 
1977, Judge Conder signed the following order 
ORDERED, as follows: 
1. That the defendant shall, within 20 days from the 
date of said hearing fully answer interrogatory # 10 of the 
interrogatories submitted by plaintiff about May 27, 1975. 
2. The defendants shall, within ten days after the date 
of said hearing, produce for inspection and copying the counsel 
for plaintiff, copies of income tax returns for the years 1972 
and thereafter. As to tax returns of which the defendants 
have no copies defendants are to within ten days from the date 
of said hearing order copies of said tax returns from the Utah 
Tax Commission and from the Internal Revenue Service, and 
shall furnish copies of said returns to counsel for plaintiff upon 
receipt therefrom from said taxing authorities. 
3. Plaintiff's motion to strike the stay order and to 
confirm the judgment herein is denied in part without prejudice· 
[On July 22, 1977, the defendants filed an answer to Interrogator> 
No. 10, and served notice upon plaintiff's counsel that the tax returns would 
be available for inspection on July 27 at 11: 00 a. m. l 
- 8 -
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On November 30, 1977, long after Interrogatory No. 10 had been 
answered, Judge Conder's second order (prepared by plaintiff's counsel) was 
entered. It provided, in pertinent part, as follows (R. 361-362): 
ORDERED, as follows: 
That defendants shall furnish to plaintiff for inspection 
and copying the income tax returns for the years 1972, 1973, 
1974, 1975 and 1976 filed with Internal Revenue Service and the 
Utah State Tax Commission by each of the defendants. To the 
extent that defendants do not have copies of said tax returns 
in their possession or available to them they are ordered to 
forthwith apply for and to obtain copies thereof from the 
governmental agency with whom said tax returns were filed. 
Defendants are order to make those tax returns available to 
counsel for plaintiff within 30 days. 
2. That defendants shall fully, completely, truthfully 
and accurately ~ interrogatory # 10 of the interrogatories 
dated May 27, 1975, within 20 days. Plaintiff's motion to 
compel answers to interrogatories # 2, 8, 9 and 12 is denied. 
3. Plaintiff's motion to strike the stay of enforcement of 
the judgment entered herein, which stay order is dated about 
October 20, 1977, is denied at this time upon condition that 
defendants fully comply with all of the terms of this order. In 
the event that defendants fail to fully comply with the terms of 
said order plaintiff's motion to strike stay order and to confirm 
judgment is granted. (Emphasis added.) 
On December 8, 1977, plaintiff's counsel sent to Judge Conder a third 
order based on the minute order of June 22, 1977. As submitted, this order 
was identical with the one entered on November 30, 1977, but as signed by 
Judge Conder there was a significant change. Paragraph 2 was amended by 
striking from it the words "fully, completely, truthfully and accurately, 11 so 
that the paragraph in the order as signed by Judge Conder reads as follows: 
The defendant shall answer interrogatory # 10 of the 
interrogatories dated May 27, 1975, with~ 20 days. Plaintiff'. s 
motion to compel answers to Interrogatones # 2, 8, 9 and 12 is 
denied. 
- 9 -
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The foregoing orders are of importance, because the asserted failure of 
defendants to obey the order of Judge Conder appears to be the primary . 
basis for plaintiff's subsequent motion that execution issue, and for tht 
court's granting of that motion. 
On May 9, 1978, plaintiff's counsel served upon the defendants additional 
interrogatories and requests for admissions (R. 363), which patently were 
designed to establish the fact that in answering Interrogatory No. 10 the 
defendants had failed to list all real property that they owned or had owned, I 
I 
that they had not complied with Judge Conder's order, and that plaintiffs 
therefore should retain their $85, 000 judgment without having to try the 
matter on its merits . 
On August 15, 1978, plaintiff's counsel filed a "Motion for Order 
Directing Clerk to Issue Execution" (R. 382-385). In support of the motion, 
the plaintiff set out some of the foregoing history, then referred specifically 
to the order of Judge Conder: 
6. About June l, 1977, plaintiff filed a motion to strike 
Judge Snow's order staying enforcement of the judgment (see 
paragraph No. 2 above). 
7. That motion was heard by Judge Conder about 
June 22, 1977. Judge Conder ordered defendants to produce 
certain income tax returns within 30 days. Those tax returns 
were not made available within said period. Defendants filed a 
pleading dated July 20, 1977, wherein they stated that the tax 
returns would be made availabe for inspection July 27, 1977, at 
11:00 a.m., however they were not in fact made available at 
that time. See also letter of November 9, 1977, Exhibit "I" 
attached hereto, wherein counsel for defendants indicate that 
they will thereafter produce the tax returns (which they 
eventially did do). 
8. Judge Conder also ordered the defendants "fully, 
completely, truthfully and accurately answer interrogatory # 10 
of the interrogatories dated May 27, 1975, within 20 days·" 
Under date of July 21, 1977, the defendants Marlene Sine and 
Ed Olsen filed sworn answers to said Interrogatory No 10 
- 10 -
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stating that the information furnished in that answer disclosed 
all interests in real property that the defendant then "have or 
have had . . . during the discovery period." 
9. Further investigation by plaintiff disclosed that the 
defendant~, had not "fully, completely, truthfully, or 
accurately answered that interrogatory (# 10 of the May 27 
1975, interrogatories) as had been ordered by Judge Conder'. 
Under date of May 8, 1978, plaintiff caused requests for 
admissions and interrogatories to be submitted to defendants 
requiring them to admit that they owned interests in 
approximately 8 parcels of real property which had not been 
disclosed by their answers to said Interrogatory # 10. 
Attached to said request for admissions as exhibits were title 
reports showing the ownership and/or financial interest of the 
defendants in and to various parcels of real property in Salt 
Lake and Summit Counties. Defendants did not deny those 
requests for admissions within the time required under Rule 36, 
URCP, or at all, and accordingly said request for admissions 
are deemed admitted as provided in said Rule 36, URCP. 
10. Judge Conder conditionally denied pli!intiff's Motion to 
Strike the Order of Judge Snow Staying Enforcement of the 
Judgment (paragraph # 2 above), and ordered that in the event 
that defendants failed to fully comply with the terms of the 
order that plaintiff's motion to strike the stay order and to 
confirm the judgment was granted. * * * 
11. Under the terms of Judge Conder's order and in view 
of the admissions by defendants that they owned interests in 
approximately 8 parcels of real property which were not 
disclosed in their answer to said Interrogatory # 10 (dated 
May 27, 1975), the stay order has been vacated, the judgment 
has been confirmed, and the clerk should be directed to issue 
execution and other process in aid of enforcement and collection 
of that judgment. 
Hearing on this motion was set for September 5, 1978, but on that date 
by a minute order Judge Taylor continued the hearing to September 12. On 
September 11, 1978, Jay D. Edmunds, who was plaintiff's counsel, filed a 
motion for leave to withdraw, noticing a hearing for October 3, 1978 
(R. 389), and sending a copy to the defendants. On September 12, 1978, 
the date set for hearing the motion for execution, the court also considered 
the application of Mr. Edmunds to withdraw as counsel, and Judge Taylor 
- 11 -
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granted the motion for leave to withdraw at the same time that he granted the 
motion for issuance of execution (R. 391). On September 13, 1978, Judge 
Taylor entered a formal order that execution issue and that the judgment be 
ratified and confirmed CR. 393). 
Thereafter, new counsel appeared for the defendants and moved the 
court to vacate the judgment and to stay the execution (R. 397-400). These 
matters were heard by the court on December 11, at which time Judge Taylor 
denied the motion to vacate. Following that, an appeal was filed by I 
I 
defendants Marlene Sine and Ed T. Olsen (R. 419) and a supersedeas bond 
wasfiled(R. 435). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
VACATE THE JUDGMENT. 
Other disciplines have names for it. In genetics it would be a mutation; , 
in physics, an uncontrolled reaction; in psychology, a derangement; in logic 
or semantics, a paradox; in printing, pied type. American jurisprudence has 
no established term for it, but "procedure run amuck" seems appropriate 
Here, because of neglectful counsel, use of discovery for harassment, iffy 
judgments and orders , and an unmanageable record, the appellants are the 
victims of an oppressive judgment in spite of a meritorious defense. 
The judgment is one which should not have been entered, which was 
vacated conditionally, in which the conditions were met, but which the triai 
court finally "ratified and reaffirmed." Under all the facts anc 
circumstances, the appellants should have relief from that judgment, havin! 
timely moved to vacate itpursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civi 
Procedure, which provides: 
- 12 -
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. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
m the fuz:therance of . just~ce relieve a party or his legal 
representa.tive from a fmal Judgment, order or proceeding for 
the following reasons: ( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
ex~usable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; ( 4) when, for any ~ause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; 
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed 
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than three months after 
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. * * * 
When was the "judgment, order or proceeding" entered or taken? Was it 
October 19, 1976, when first entered by Judge Snow, or September 13, 1978, 
when it was ratified and reaffirme.d by Judge Taylor? If the former, the first 
four reasons for vacation of the judgment may not be available; if the latter, 
they are. We believe it was the latter, but, in any event, relief may be 
granted under subdivision (7), which permits the vacation of a judgment for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." The 
subdivision has been broadly applied by this and other courts. 
In Dixon ~. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P. 2d 1211, 1213 (1952), the trial 
court had entered a minute order providing for temporary custody and other 
matters during the pendency of the action. Thereafter, it signed a formal 
order along the lines of the temporary order, but proporting to be a 
permanent order with respect to custody and distribution of property· A 
motion to vacate the formal order was filed more than three months after 
entry of the order, but this court approved the action of the trial court in 
vacating the formal order. The court said: 
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It is therefore apparent that counsel who presented the order 
of March 8, 1950, had prepared it with no recollection of the 
provisions of the stipulation, and that the judge signed the 
formal order under a mistaken belief that it conformed to an 
order theretofore made. 
In Ney ~- Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956), qne of the 
defendants, Alda Harrison, failed to answer the complaint because she , 
believed her former husband would handle the matter, and a default judgment 
was entered against her. Almost 11 months later, she moved for vacation of , 
the judgment and the relief was granted by the trial court. This court held I 
I 
that the asserted ground for relief properly came within the provisions of ! 
subdivision ( 7) of Rule 60(b). The court said: 
The statutory authority of trial courts to set aside 
judgments obtained by default has been liberally construed to 
the end that there be trial on the merits, beginning with our 
earliest decisions. In the recent case of Warren v. Dixon 
Ranch Co. [Utah, 260 P. 2d 741, 742], we had occasion to 
review the policy considerations and reaffirmed the attitude of 
liberal construction, thus: 
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a 
creature of equity designed to relieve against 
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may 
occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs 
of the opposing party, or misfortunes which 
prevent the presentation of a claim or defense. 
* * * Equity considers factors which may be 
irrelevant in actions at law, such as the * * * 
hardship in granting or denying relief. Although 
an equity court no longer has complete discretion 
in granting or denying relief it may exercise wide 
judicial discretion in weighing the factors of 
fairness and public convenience, and this court 
on appeal will reverse the trial court only where 
an abuse of discretion is clearly shown." 
The trial court could well regard this as among the class 
of cases that Rule 60(b)(7) was intended to govern and to 
permit Alda to justify her failure to answer on the groun.d that 
the divorce decree required her husband to bear the obligation 
and required him to defend the action for her. 
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In Stewart ~. Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d 156, 506 P. 2d 74 (1973), the court 
entered orders in two consolidated cases dismissing them with prejudice on 
the ground that the plaintiff had failed to answer interrogatories. The 
attorney for the plaintiff was subsequently suspended from practice, new 
counsel was obtained, and more than a year after the judgment had been 
entered the court vacated it and entered a new judgment dismissing the 
actions without prejudice. In holding that the order vacating the judgment 
had properly been entered by the trial court, this court considered a number 
of circumstances. The court said: 
There are certain circumstances in connection with this 
matter that should be noted. The plaintiff had answered 
interrogatories submitted to him by the defendant Richard 
Monk Allen prior to the consolidation of the two cases. The 
interrogatories and the answers are substantially the same as 
those submitted to the plaintiff by the defendant Sullivan. 
After the consolidation of the cases that information was 
available to all parties. At the time the first order of 
dismissal was entered it appears that the court and counsel for 
the defendant Allen were of the impression that the order made 
was a dismissal without prejudice. In a telephone conversation 
between counsel for the defendant Allen and counsel for the 
plaintiff, Allen's counsel informed counsel for the plaintiff that 
the dismissal was without prejudice. Plaintiff had no 
knowledge of the dismissal and subsequent motions made in 
respect thereto. It was not until several months after his 
counsel became incapacitated to represent him and the plaintiff 
had employed other counsel he learned what had transpired. 
In view of the above recited circumstances and the fact 
that there was no disposition of the case on the merits, we are 
of the opinion that the court below did not abu~e ~ts disc:etion 
in its determination that the action should be dismissed without 
prejudice. The provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) are sufficien.tly 
broad to permit the court to set aside its former order which 
appeared to have been entered upon an erroneous assumpti?n 
and to enter a new order based upon the record before it. 
Other courts have found additional situations which come within the 
"catch-all" portion of Rule 60(b). Our subdivision (7) is the same as 
subdivision ( 6) of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure· L. P. 
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Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F. 2d 234 (D. C. Cir. 1964), is a case 
somewhat similar to the present one. In that case the plaintiff's counsel ) 
badly mishandled the suit. In October 1960, the complaint was dismissed, 
after notice to plaintiff's then counsel, for failure to prosecute. 1 Two years 
later, on October 22, 1962, the plaintiff by new counsel moved to reinstate, 
the suit. The district court granted the motion, defendant appealed, and the 
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. , 
The court noted that the former counsel had been "beset with personal I 
problems" which involved the serious illness of his wife and recent deaths of 
his parents, that the plaintiffs and others in plaintiffs' behalf had made 
numerous inquiries of the counsel who refused to answer them and who 
assured the plaintiff from time to time that the case was proceeding although 
there was no foundation for counsel's reassuring statements. When the 
plaintiff learned by personally checking the court records that the case had 
been dismissed for failure to prosecute, his former counsel told him steps 
would be taken to reinstate the case, but no action was taken. On appeal of 
the district court's order vacating the judgment, the appellant claimed that 
the motion to reinstate the judgment was barred by the one-year time limit in 
Clause (1), concerning excusable neglect, which corresponds in the Federal 
Rules with the three-month time limit in the Utah Rules. The court of 
appeals said: 
But the district court did not act on the theory of 
excusable neglect. On the contrary, it expressly applied the 
"'catch-all' rule" 60(b) ( 6). Counsel's neglect was not excusable 
and the court, by clear implication, so found. The judge felt 
"that in this particular case the client, plaintiff, a person 
unfamiliar with court procedures, should not be penalized by 
the action of his counsel who admittedly did not attend to the 
matter when he received' notice of the contemplated dismissal." 
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On the part of Matthews [plaintiff] himself there was no 
neglect. * * * Clause (1) of Rule 60( b) is not and Clause ( 6) 
is broad enough to permit relief when as in this case personal 
problems of counsel cause him grossly to neglect a diligent 
client's case and mislead the client. Clause (6) "vests power in 
courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever 
such action is appropriate to accomplish justice. 11 
The holding and reasoning of the Steuart case was followed in King v. 
Mordowanec, 46 F. R. D. 474 (D. C. R. I. 1969), vacating a judgment because of 
the neglect of counsel, though the motion to vacate was not filed for 
approximately a year and nine months after dismissal of the suit. 
In the present case there is a strange conglomeration of circumstances. 
There was attorney neglect, much of it inexcusable. A set of interrogatories 
was served upon defendants' counsel on November 9, 1972, but between that 
date and January 14, 1974, some 14 months later, nothing had been done with 
respect to answering the interrogatories or arguing the motion to dismiss the 
complaint, and within two days after service of the motion for sanctions, 
plaintiff's then attorney resigned and was replaced by Jay D. Edmunds. 
Then, on January 18, 1974, the motion for sanctions was continued without 
date, and nothing more was done in the case until January 9, 1975, 
11 months later, when plaintiff's counsel set a hearing for the motions to 
dismiss and the motion for sanctions. Defendant's counsel did not appear; 
the motion to dismiss was denied, and the motion for sanctions was granted. 
An order was entered that the discovery would be complied with within 
20 days of January 27, 1975. Nothing was done, and on April 22, 1975, some 
three months later, plaintiff's counsel filed a notice of motion for judgment. 
On June 6, 1975, plaintiff's counsel appeared before the Honorable 
Maurice Harding at which time Judge Harding granted plaintiff's motion to 
strike defendants' answer and enter judgment. Defendants' counsel was not 
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present. On July 7, 1975, a notice was sent out that plaintiff's motion for 
judgment or sanctions would be heard on July 21, 1975. Defendants' counsel 
did .not appear and plaintiff's motion for judgment was granted. On 
I 
August 28, 1975, the parties appeared and argued a motion to 'set aside the 
judgment. The court granted the motion and gave the defendants 15 days 
within which to answer. Counsel did not prepare an order for the judge's 
signature and did not prepare any answers as required, and on April 20, 
1976, more than seven months later, plaintiff's counsel moved to strike the 
minute entry. Arguments on this motion were continued several times and 
finally, on June 29, 1976, it was continued without date. 
Finally, on October 19, 1976, after argument, Judge Snow entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and a judgment for $84, 788. 78. A 
motion to set the judgment aside was filed by counsel, set for argument on 
October 29, and again continued several times, finally to be heard on 
November 24, 1976. 
At this point, affidavits were filed indicating that defendants' counsel 
had been ill between August 28 and late September or early October and it 
was impossible for him to carry on a professional practice. At about this 
same time, Joseph H. Bottum and Clyde C. Patterson appeared as co-counsel 
for the defendants, but the basis for their appearance is not clear and it may 
be inferred from the file that they were retained by Mr. Edmunds to help hiJ11 
out of his predicament. There is no indication that the new counsel were in 
contact with the defendants, or were retained by the defendants. They were 
never heard from again. 
On August 15, 1978, plaintiff's counsel moved for an order directing the 
clerk to issue execution on the judgment that had been entered on 
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October 19, 1976, and conditionally vacated thereafter. The matter was set 
for hearing on September 5 at which time Mr. Edmunds "moved the court for 
an order continuing hearing on this matter for one week to give defendants 
an opportunity to employ new counsl." This motion was granted on condition 
that the defendants pay to counsel for plaintiff the sum of $100 as attorneys' 
fees. But it was not until September 11, 1978, the day before that set for 
hearing of the motion for execution, that a notice of the motion for leave to 
withdraw as counsel was mailed to the defendants, and on the following day, 
counsel for plaintiff having "waived time for hearing of that motion," the 
court granted the motion to withdraw in the same breath that it granted the 
motion for execution. This was hardly an atmosphere in which the 
defendants' counsel would be expected to devote his best efforts to resisting 
the plaintiff's motion for issuance of execution. 
The record contains 24· minute orders which were entered during the 
tenure of Mr. Edmunds as counsel for the defendants. In ten of those 24 
either no counsel is listed as having been present for the defendants, or 
Mr. Edmunds' s name is followed by "NP" --not present. 
Added to the neglect of counsel in this case is the tactic of plaintiff's 
counsel with respect to the use of discovery. A review of the file shows that 
the plaintiff's counsel was among those who have been using the discovery 
methods for the purposes of harassment rather than as legitimate devises to 
aid in the preparation for trial. The definitions employed by the plaintiff's 
counsel make it almost impossible for one to answer the interrogatories as 
fully as demanded, at least not within the current year· 
. . d with The various orders as presented to and signed by the JU ges 
respect to judgments and conditional vacations of those judgments were such 
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as to leave anyone confused as to the status of the case. It is impossible to 
tell from reading of the file whether there was a judgment or not at any 
particular time--a fact attributable in large measure to the method used by 
plaintiff's counsel in the preparation of orders. For example, in' the court's 
order of December 30, 1976 (R. 272-273), paragraph 1 provided that the 
judgment would be vacated and set aside upon the performance of certain 
conditions such as the payment of $1, 000 and compliance with discovery 
Paragraph 2 provided that in event the defendants failed to fully comply with 
the conditions "then defendants' motion to vacate and set aside the judgment 
entered herein on or about the 24th day of November, 1976, is hereby 
denied," creating confusion as to when the effective date of the denial would 
be. 
In Judge Conder's order of November 29, 1977--the second in the 
series--the plaintiff's motion to strike the stay of enforcement of the judgment 
was denied upon condition, following which there was a provision that: 
In the event that defendants fail to fully comply with the terms 
of said order plaintiff's motion to strike stay order and to 
confirm judgment is granted. 
Then there is the same language in the court's third order of December 9. 
1977. Orders so phrased make it impossible for counsel to determine whether 
there is a judgment or whether there isn't; whether there is a stay 01 
exeuction or whether there isn't; and whether the judgment has beer 
confirmed or whether it hasn't. Orders of this type contribute to the genera 
disarray pervading this record. 
Finally, the court committed other serious errors. Much of the materii 
that is found in the record and which has been set out in the brief i 
valuable to this court in considering the history of the case, but the matte! 
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directly affecting the point raised on this appeal center around the three 
orders entered by Judge Conder, and the plaintiff's motion for an order 
directing execution. 
The events leading directly to this appeal began on June 2, 1977, when 
the plaintiff filed a motion to strike a stay order previously issued and to 
confirm the judgment which had been entered on October 19, 1976. This 
matter was heard by Judge Conder on June 22, 1977, at which time he 
entered a minute order denying the motion in part and directing the 
defendants to furnish income tax returns and to answer Interrogatory No. 10. 
This minute order was followed by a formal order, signed by Judge Conder 
on July 18, 1977, that the defendants would answer Interrogatory No. 10 
within 20 days of May 27, 1975, and produce income tax returns. 
On July 22, 1977, defendants' counsel mailed to plaintiff's counsel a 
notice that the tax returns would be available on July 22 and also sent an 
answer to Interrogatory No: 10. Four months later, on about November 30, 
1977, plaintiff's counsel presented to the court an order which was 
substantially different from that signed by Judge Conder on July 18. This 
one directed the defendants to answer Interrogatory No. 10 (which had 
already been answered) "fully, completely, truthfully, and accurately." 
Thereafter a third order, identical to the second, was presented to Judge 
Conder by plaintiff's counsel, but when he signed the third order on 
December 9, 1977, Judge Conder struck the words "fully, completely, 
truthfully, and accurately" in directing an answer to Interrogatory No· 10 · 
Nevertheless, when the plaintiff filed its motion for an order directing 
the clerk to issue execution, no mention was made of the conflicting orders of 
Judge Conder, and reference was made only to the language in the order of 
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I 
November 30 that the defendants would answer Interrogatory No. 10 "fully, 
completely, truthfully and accurately." It was not pointed out in the motion, 
or thereafter to Judge Taylor so far as the record appears, that ~ere had 
been a subsequent order by Judge Conder eliminating those words. And the 1 
factual basis for the motion, presented to Judge Taylor and apparently relied I 
upon by him, was that the defendants had not answered Interrogatory No. 10 
"truthfully" because they had failed to list some parcels of real property that ~ 
were then or had once been in their names. Thus, as in Stewart ~- i 
Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d, 156, 506 P. 2d 7 4 ( 1973) , cited above, both the court 
and counsel were suffering under a misapprehension as to the contents of the I 
record and the status of the case. The misapprehension is understandable, 
considering the record that has been generated, but to be understandable is 
not justification for imposing upon a party an unwarranted judgment and 
refusing to vacate it when the true facts are pointed out. I 
In considering the plaintiff's motion for an order directing the clerk to 
issue execution, the trial court erred in another significant respect. It was 
improper for the trial court to consider the withdrawal motion of attorney 
Edmunds at the same hearing at which Mr. Edmunds was supposed to be 
protecting the interests of his clients. Rule 2. 5 of the Rules of Practice in 
the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah provides: 
When an attorney * * * withdraws from the case or ceases 
to act as an attorney, the party to an action for whom such 
attorney was acting, must before any further proceedings are 
had against him, be required by the adverse party, by written 
notice to appoint another attorney or to appear in person. 
This was not done in this case. Indeed the trial court permitted 
withdrawal at the same moment that he was considering final disposition of tbe 
case. Although plaintiff's counsel argued that Joseph Bottum and Clyde C 
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Patterson were co-counsel and that no such notice was necessary, it is 
apparent from the record that their appearance was for a single purpose. 
After appearing on an early motion to vacate a judgment, because 
Mr. Edmunds had been ill and not attending to business, they never 
thereafter appeared on any pleadings or papers in the case, except notices 
sent by Mr. Barker. When Mr. Edmunds appeared before the court on 
September 5, 1978, the time set for the hearing of plaintiff's motion for 
execution, it was represented that time was needed in order to permit 
defendants to obtain new counsel, nothing being said by any party or by the 
court about the fact that somewhere in the record the names of Joseph Bottum 
and Clyde C. Patterson can be found. 
This case has some of the elements that were present in Westinghouse 
Electric ~ Company v. Paul Yi. Larsen Contractor, Inc. , 544 P. 2d 876 
(Utah 1975), in which this court found that a trial court had abused its 
discretion in refusing to vacate a judgment. In that case, considerable time 
had been used in connection with discovery procedures; the defendant claimed 
that the plaintiff had failed to produce invoices and records as requested, 
and that the failure to provide the information substantially impaired the 
defendant's ability to defend the action. The defendant filed a request for 
the production of voluminous documents in September of 1973. They were not 
produced within the time required by the rule and counsel for the plaintiff 
telephoned the defendant's counsel in May, 1974, and left a message that the 
records were at the plaintiff's office, and because of their volume, 
defendant's counsel should come there to examine them. Thereafter, while 
some discovery was still pending, the trial court on February 27, 1975, 
granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute the action. 
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The dismissal was with prejudice. The plaintiff moved under Rule 60(b) to 
vacate the order, the motion was denied by the trial court, and the plaintiff 
appealed, contending that the court had abused its discretion. 
This court considered that the question on review was whether the 
granting of the motion to dismiss with prejudice was an abuse of discretion. 
In holding that there was an abuse of discretion and that the judgment should 
be vacated, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Crockett, said: 
* * *these observations are pertinent: although there was 
unusual delay in getting this case to trial, this was due in 
large part to the unusual circumstances delineated above. 
Further, we are not impressed that the defendants themselves 
were overly diligent or manifest any particular haste in getting 
the pretrial discovery procedures completed and on with the 
trial. They did not do so in responsive action to 
Westinghouse's having assembled records, nor to the latter's 
messages concerning their availability, nor did they seek any 
assistance from the court. 
It is indeed commendable-to handle cases with dispatch and 
to move calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to 
date. But it is even more important to keep in mind that the 
very reason for the existence of courts is to afford disputants 
an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them. In 
conformity with that principal the courts generally tend to favor 
granting relief from default judgments were there is any 
reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial prejudice 
or injustice to the adverse party. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a case in which the defendants are being subjected to a 
substantial and burdensome judgment because of a commingling of counsel's 
neglect, abuse of the discovery processes, procedural obfuscations, 
misrepresentations to the court, and, ultimately, the trial court's 
misconception of the tenor of an order previously entered. It is a case that 
should be tried on the merits since the defendants have raised a defense, 
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.... 
which if established, is meritorious, i.e. , that they gave to the president of 
Empire Corporation money with which to pay off the Valley Bank and Trust 
Company note and that instead of paying it off he caused it to be transferred 
to Empire Corporation; and that it was the president and managing officer of 
Empire Corporation who, if anyone, was the alter ego of Empire Credit, Inc. 
It seems clear that if Judge Taylor had been aware of the character of 
the order entered by Judge Conder in this case that he would not have 
denied the motion to vacate the judgment. Moreover, his order of September, 
1978, was influenced by a misconception of the law of discovery. While one 
of the orders signed by Judge Conder required that the Interrogatory No. 10 
be answered. "truthfully," it has been held that failure of a party to answer 
an interrogatory truthfully is not ground for imposition of the sanctions of 
Rule 37, but may be only a ground for initiating a perjury complaint. See 4A 
Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed), 11 37.06, p. 37-103, note 29. 
Because of the misconception of counsel and court as to the duties 
placed on defendants by Judge Conder's order of December 9, 1977; because 
of the confusing nature of the record, because of the neglect of counsel; and 
because of the refusal of the court to follow its own rules with respect to 
withdrawal of counsel, the defendants in this case were denied a trial on the 
merits. The court's refusal to vacate the judgment of October 29, 1976, or of 
September 13, 1978 (whichever was the "judgment"), was an abuse of 
discretion and this court should reverse and remand the case to the trial 
court with directions to permit the parties to proceed to trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __ day of April, 1979, I served the 
attached Brief of Appellants upon Ronald C. Barker, Esq. , attorney for 
respondent, by depositing copies thereof in the United States mails, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Ronald C . Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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